This paper looks at the impact of the rise of China on the geopolitical configuration and international relations in the East Asian region the main flashpoints of which include the high-profile disputes over the ownership of the islands, atolls, reefs, cays and islets in the South China Sea (SCS)/ Biển Đông (East Vietnam Sea)/West Philippine Sea which reflect in a large part in reality resource conflicts. The rapid growth of China's population, with an increase of more than ten million people per year, and the general shortage in energy resources to feed her rapid economic growth underlines the importance of the resource-rich SCS. In terms of geopolitics, the Spratlys occupy a highly important strategic position, the key to the control of the SCS and critical hub in China's sea route transport connection with East Asia, West Asia and the Indian Ocean. Looking at the Spratlys and Paracels disputes as the major military-related security problem in the relations between China and ASEAN, the paper examines the challenges posed by China's ascendance in the global arena in recent decades, in particular within the context of the changing ASEAN-China relations in terms of both geopolitical and economic terms, with special focus on the attendant problem of the conflict in the SCS and the critical issue of finding a solution to the conflict.
Introduction 1
This paper looks at the impact of the rise of the People's Republic of China (PRC) on the geopolitical configuration and international relations in the East Asian region the main flashpoints of which include the high-profile disputes over the ownership of the islands, atolls, reefs, cays and islets in the South China Sea (SCS)/Biển Đông (East Vietnam Sea)/West Philippine Sea 2 which actually reflect in a large part in reality resource conflicts. Due to the rapid growth of China's population, with an increase of more than ten million people per year, and the fact that despite her immense land mass, only 13 per cent of China consists of arable land and the country has 40 per cent less arable land per capita than anywhere else in the world 3 , the problems of overfarming, overgrazing and overlogging have resulted in deforestation, desertification and river pollution that have led to severe water shortage in almost all major cities in northern China. This plus the general shortage in energy resources to feed her rapid economic growth underlines the importance of the resource-rich SCS especially around the Spratlys 4 . As SCS's petroleum reserve, according to China, amounts to 60 billion tons which could be adequate for a century's consumption, it could prove to be a lifeline for China whose own petroleum reserve could hardly last two more decades given the present rate of extraction. 5 Besides, with its other resources worth above US$1 trillion 6 , SCS could prove to be a treasure trove for China, a country so populous yet so relatively short of land resources. Furthermore, the abundance in marine produce of the Spratlys and the neighbouring waters is said to constitute an area not less than 100 thousand square kilometres, i.e. about equivalent to mainland China's total area of food production, making the former a possible second "granary" of China. 7 In terms of geopolitics, the Spratlys occupy a highly important strategic position, the key to the control of the SCS and critical hub in China's sea route transport connection with East Asia, West Asia and the Indian Ocean. As more than 70 per cent of China's import of petroleum is through the Strait of Malacca and South China Sea, the control of the Spratlys is strategically important for ensuring a safe sea route passage for China. 8 Hence, the Spratlys and Paracels 9 disputes, being the major militaryrelated security problem in the relations between China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), can be seen as one of the major challenges posed by China's ascendance in the global arena in recent decades, in particular within the context of the changing ASEAN-China relations. For instance, the earlier altercation over the Spratlys in 2009 saw China protesting against the Philippine president Gloria MacapagalArroyo's signing of a controversial baselines bill into a law affirming 杨国庆 林燕萍 梁伟立 海域冲突与民族主义 255 the country's claim of her territorial waters, extended continental shelf, economic zones, and the controversial Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and Scarborough shoal off the waters of Palawan province, on 10th March 2009, an action described by some to be a political distraction amidst domestic instability brought about by the global financial crisis, but attributed by others to the requirement to meet the deadline of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) set on 13th May 2009 for countries and archipelagic states to submit their claims for an extended continental shelf. 10 Nevertheless, as a general policy orientation, whatever her ultimate strategic concerns, China has been untiringly reassuring her neighbours in this region that hers is a "peaceful" rise or even more carefully, "peaceful development". An illustration of this stance can be seen when Chinese foreign minister Yang Jiechi 杨洁篪 visited Jakarta in August 2012, and said that preserving stability in the SCS was the joint responsibility of all countries within the region and China was willing to work with the ASEAN countries to implement the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and the eventual Code of Conduct. 11 Despite that, it is inevitable that many in the region would see this Asian giant's economic ascendance over the last three decades and the concomitant expansion of her "soft power", if left unchecked, to be a major problem not only to the developing countries in the region but also to the rest of the world. Although it appears unlikely that any major conflict would appear in the SCS area in the near future, the increasing frequency of incidents in the area does translate into a higher possibility of accidental clashes escalating into serious confrontations. 12 Indeed, experts on the SCS area have written about the potential of military conflicts arising from mere accidents as the margin for error narrows with countries involved in the SCS conflicts constantly pushing the boundaries. 13 
Challenges in Seeking Mechanism for Conflict Resolution within the Context of ASEAN-China Cooperation
As the 2002 ASEAN-China Declaration of the Conduct of Parties (DOC) in the South China Sea is neither a legally binding agreement nor an enforceable document, another mechanism indeed needs to be found involving all parties concerned (mainland China, Taiwan and the ASEAN claimant states) with acceptable rules and regulations, both for confidence-building and mediating conflicts and disputes when they arise. Of course, commitment from all parties is the key to make installation of such a mechanism possible. In this regard, economic reality, historical legacy and resurgent nationalist sentiments could combine to play a negative role. 17 as he has no confidence in the use of international judicial process to resolve the territory disputes concerned 18 , and that the best time of solving them by peaceful means has already passed, and further diplomatic negotiations will lead to nowhere. 19 It must be noted however that popular nationalism could act as a double-edged sword, limiting the claimant's room for maneuver -any compromise over border disputes could be seen a sign of weakness, possibly provoking nationalist backlash. 20 This is especially so with China facing a leadership transition. Chulalongkorn University's political science professor, Thitinan Pongsudhirak, opines that China has become "more assertive and less hedged" as it attempts to avoid appearing weak during a key leadership transition year. 21 Some analysts see signs of nationalistic tendencies that could lead to greater willingness to use force with the ongoing power transition. 22 Further, the recent escalation of the conflict over the Senkaku Islands 23 between China and Japan could further complicate efforts for SCS dispute resolution for ASEAN countries. To substantiate her claim for the Senkaku Islands, China is likely to adopt an even tougher stance when dealing with disputes in the SCS area.
One most notable aspect of China's foreign policy that has often been perceived by the United States of America (US) and other Western powers as provocative is her global search for energy in terms of her perceived role in accelerating the global arms race and the propping up of dictatorial regimes across the globe from Southeast Asia to Africa. 24 The global financial crisis seems to be turning into an opportunity for China to intensify her global quest for petroleum and other natural resources as while the Chinese economy is equally suffering from the crisis with slower growth, unlike many other countries, her banking system is not as badly affected by the crisis and hence is still able to extend credits to enterprises to support the major projects of the government. While China's present foreign policy seems to emphasize cooperation and stability in order to promote her own security, development and wealth, her escalating demand for energy resources is today no longer solely a matter of her own domestic concern, but is increasingly acquiring new dimensions that have a powerful influence on her international politico-economic relations. However, it has also been argued that it is not the hunger for undersea resources that brings about increasing assertiveness of the Chinese government -such considerations apply equally to disputes on the land, but have not precluded settlements and compromises. A more probable explanation lies in strategic interests, i.e. China's national security and her ability to project and expand her powers in the international arena. 25 While both balancing and bandwagoning strategies can be expected to enhance mutual interdependence and security, China seems to be fostering a foreign policy position primarily tailored for resource access, development, wealth and economic gain: a policy that sometimes seems to sit more comfortably with bandwagoning than with balancing.
Sino-Vietnamese Relations
On the other hand, with regards to regional bilateral relations, complex legacies from modern history such as that which is still haunting SinoJapanese relations are not unknown either in the case of Sino-Vietnamese relations. Despite their close alliance during the Vietnam War, relations between the two countries have been plagued by regional rivalries and territorial disputes such as the delineation of territorial waters in the Tonkin/Beibu Gulf 26 and sovereignty over the Paracel Islands and Spratly Islands in the SCS. The potential of offshore oil deposits in the Gulf of Tonkin also raises tensions over territorial waters. 
The Binh Minh 02 Incident and Other Conflicts in SCS
Vietnam lodged a diplomatic protest on 27th May 2011 with China's ambassador claiming that the actions of three China Maritime Surveillance ships on 26th May 2011 violated international law and Vietnam's sovereignty when they accosted the Binh Minh 02, a Vietnamese seismic survey ship operating in Block 148, and cut a cable towing seismic monitoring equipment. According to Vietnam, this was not the first instance in which the Chinese had cut the cable of a Vietnamese exploration vessel. China's response on 28th May was a statement that what had occurred constituted normal marine law-enforcement and surveillance activities in China's jurisdictional area. Vietnam retorted on 29th May, arguing that the area concerned situates entirely in the exclusive economic zone and the 200-nautical-mile (three hundred and seventy kilometers) continental shelf of Vietnam in accordance with the 1982 United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and hence is not a disputed area. This incident was followed by another on 9th June 2011 in the vicinity of Vanguard Bank in which Vietnam claimed that a Chinese fishing boat equipped with a "cable cutting device" snared the cable of the PetroVietnam-chartered Viking II seismic survey ship which earlier had been involved in two separate incidents on 29th May and 31st May in which Chinese boats attempted to approach its rear deck and interfere with its operations before security escorts successfully blocked their approaches. On the contrary, China claimed that the 9th June incident occurred when armed Vietnamese ships chased Chinese fishing boats from the Vanguard Bank and one of the Chinese boats became entangled in the cable of the Viking II and was dragged for more than an hour before the entangled net could be cut. On 9th June 2011, Vietnam announced a live-fire exercise to be held on 13th June 2011 in the waters near Hon Ong Island (after the Chinese Ambassador to the Philippines called on Vietnam and the Philippines to cease oil exploration and after China announced it would be conducting routine naval exercises in the Western Pacific), a military exercise swiftly denounced by the official Chinese media as an expression of nationalism to create a new enmity between the two countries.
Sino-Philippine Relations over SCS
On the other hand, the Philippines has claimed that there had been six or seven major incursions by Chinese warships, patrol boats, marine vessels, jet fighters, maritime surveillance vessels and People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) ships into waters claimed by the Philippines in the first five months of 2011. The major disputes in the SCS between China and the Philippines are over the sovereignty of the Scarborough Reef and Mischief Reef. Chinese troops detained a Filipino fishing vessel around the Mischief Reef area in January 1995 and tensions were heightened again in 1997 and 1998 when Chinese warships upgraded the construction structures on the Mischief Reef and nearby islands.
More recently, on 12th September 2012, the President of the Philippines, Benigno Aquino III, announced that his government had officially named the waters off the west coast of the Philippines as "West Philippine Sea" and would register the name with the United Nations. 28 According to the President of the Philippines, the name change was designated to clarify which areas the country is claiming. Presidential spokesman Edwin Lacierda said that the move should not cause anger among the country's neighbours as the area that was renamed was limited to the country's exclusive economic zone provided under the UNCLOS. 29 However, China dismissed the Philippines' renaming of the waters and said that it did not affect China's sovereignty claims. China's foreign ministry spokesman Hong Lei said that "the act by the Philippines cannot in the least way change the fact that China has indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea and adjacent waters". 30 An informal white paper by former Filipino officials revealed that the disputes have brought about a sharp deterioration in the country's relationship with China, increased the need for further cooperation with the US in defense, and accelerated the urgency to build a common consensus among ASEAN nations. 
The Importance of Official Multilateral Dialogues for Conflict Resolution
Besides bilateral negotiation, it should also be important to initiate official multilateral dialogues for conflict resolution over the SCS given 33 for alongside the setting up of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) claims could be made by any nation that could establish a settlement on the islands in the region. While it is indeed an irony that an international law that aims to resolve maritime disputes could actually aggravate them, the setting up of EEZs has indeed created the potential for overlapping claims in semi-enclosed seas like the SCS. While UNCLOS's Article 121 states that "rocks that cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf", there is no provision to effectively stop any nation from building a settlement on any "island" in the SCS in order to establish a clear title, and indeed clashes had occurred when the various SCS claimant states attempted to set up outposts, mostly military, to conform with Article 121 in pressing their claims. There has indeed been speculation that China's U-shaped nine-dash-line claim could be founded on her occupation of nine rocks in the Spratlys which bring with them 200-nautical-mile EEZ though it may be legally doubtful as these rocks are unable to sustain human habitation and have an economic function, and hence according to Article 121 they would have no claim to EEZ or continental shelf. 34 Clashes in the SCS have long cast a shadow over regional relations, and at times could turn vicious. China and Vietnam have the most severe disputes over sovereignty of the Paracel Islands, with the first armed conflict occurring in January 1974 when Chinese forces overran the South Vietnamese position and have since occupied the islands. In another incident in 1988 at Fiery Cross Reef, the Chinese sank three Vietnamese vessels, killing 72 people. However, after the 1995 Mischief Reef incident, major complaints have reduced though there were still occasions in which shooting took place between Vietnam and China over oil explorations in the overlapping EEZ. The same difficulty arises at the higher ASEAN-China level. In July 2012, ASEAN foreign ministers met in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, at the ASEAN Regional Forum, with the Cambodian prime minister Hun Sen claiming, prior to the meeting, that one of the prime objectives was for member countries to formulate a code of conduct with China in relation to the SCS dispute. The prime minister was of the belief that ASEAN could serve as a platform to promote dialogue and cooperation on political and security issues. 38 However, the Phnom Penh meeting failed to produce a joint communiqué for the first time in ASEAN's 45-year history. Cambodia, chair of the summit, had refused to allow the Philippines to include language referring to a recent standoff over the Scarborough Shoal in the communiqué, insisting that such disputes were bilateral in nature. According to certain quarters, the objection of Cambodia was largely due to China's influence. 39 One report even stated that the microphone went dead right when the Philippine foreign minister Albert Ferreros del Rosario started to raise sensitive issues about the SCS during the summit. Some delegates at the summit expressed concerns about something more sinister than a technical glitch, reflecting their frustration towards Cambodia's effort to keep the issue off the agenda. 40 Some others had argued that the reason for the failure to reach an agreement lay in the Philippines' pushing for a code beyond conflict management to include conflict-resolution mechanisms, while other member states resisted the move.
Regardless of the true reason for the collapse, a compromise was reached at the end with an outline of the "proposed elements" of a code of conduct. However, there appears to be nothing new in the outline, with no mechanism to make the code of conduct legally binding, and this was even before ASEAN brings forward its case to negotiate with China. 41 The ASEAN summit shows that divisions within the ASEAN members themselves actually run into several layers deep -between claimants and non-claimants, and even between the ASEAN claimant states. 42 The dean of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore claimed that the ASEAN summit outcome is "a disaster", showing that a new geopolitical struggle between China and the US was crystalizing in the ASEAN region, potentially splitting ASEAN as its member countries were drawn in different directions. 43 If a consensus could not be reached even among the ASEAN countries, any long-term official multilateral resolution for the SCS disputes will fail to materialize. Indeed, following a meeting with his Chinese counterpart Yang Jiechi, Malaysia's foreign minister Anifah Aman implied that ASEAN would need a more united front in its negotiation with an "increasingly assertive" China, with the first step being the resolution of overlapping claims among the ASEAN nations. 44 
Cooperative Resource Management and Joint Exploration in the SCS
An amicable solution to the South China Sea conflict can move around the two prongs of protection and development of the Sea. While China and the ASEAN claimant states have agreed since 2002 in principle to avoid using force to resolve the SCS dispute, an agreement on how to develop a resolution of the conflict is never in sight. While a Joint Development Agreement (JDA) has been suggested to put aside the sovereignty conflicts, a sort of to agree to disagree, and concentrate on joint resource development in the SCS, little progress has been made. Rosenberg and Chung (2008) attributes the lack of multilateral regimes providing maritime security in the SCS to, among others, (1) divergent priorities and activities, (2) the fact that many coastal states give higher priority to protecting national sovereignty and control over their newly acquired ocean resources than cross-national collective efforts, and (3) mutual suspicions about military and intelligence-gathering activities. 45 They rightly point out, under such constraints, the importance of joint development and joint explorations which will undoubtedly help to promote trust and reduce suspicions and enmity, e.g., cooperative resource management for security and sustainability in the case of fisheries to overcome the problem of overfishing, pollution, etc. and joint seismic surveys for offshore exploration like that has been conducted before between China, Vietnam and the Philippines in the SCS, and others. For instance, on 11th November 2003, China and the Philippines signed in Beijing a US$700 million agreement to jointly explore petroleum in South China Sea. It represents a valuable step forward to solve the South China Sea dispute since the signing of the ASEAN-China Declaration of the Conduct of Parties in 2002. While the agreement is yet to lead to real exploitation, it has nevertheless paved to road to deeper cooperation and the realization of the approach of setting aside the thorny question of sovereignty to make way for joint development. 46 Of course, there might be political risks domestically, e.g. the Philippine Congress's accusation against the Arroyo administration's joint marine seismic undertaking (JMSU) agreement with China, but eventually it is probably inevitable for the claimant nations to set aside whatever conflicting claims and mutual suspicions to cooperate in the exploration and sustainable use of the resources of the SCS, in managing the increase in shipping traffic, as well as to address maritime security threats like piracy.
Another precedent is related to the Sino-Vietnam maritime dispute which is admittedly the most complex component in the South China Sea/ Biển Đông dispute. The Sino-Vietnam dispute mainly involves the Spratlys and the Beibu/Tonkin Gulf. Given the enmity and distrust ensued from the 1979 border war and 1988 sea battle, the settlement of the Beibu/Tonkin Gulf dispute between the two countries with the setting up a common fishery zone was impressive. It is indeed a good example of putting aside the sensitive island sovereignty issue to make way for a win-win solution of joint exploration and development. 47 
Constructive Multilateral Exchanges
Ultimately, constructive multilateral exchanges and interactions rather than confrontations and bandwagoning could be the key to solving the SCS conflicts. The US has backed ASEAN initiatives with respect to the Code of Conduct, when at the July 2010 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) meeting, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton proposed ASEAN to serve as a multilateral venue for SCS negotiations 48 . In this regard, the US has emphasized the importance of Asian politico-security organizations led by ASEAN: the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the East Asia Summit (EAS, with an upcoming meeting in November 2011), and the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM+). 49 Indonesian president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in his keynote speech to the 2011's 44th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Bali, which culminated with talks on regional security which would include China, Japan and the US, stated that the ARF could "finalize the long overdue guidelines because we need to get moving to the next phase, which is identifying elements of the Code of Conduct … We need to send a strong signal to the world that the future of the South China Sea is a predictable, manageable and optimistic one." 50 ASEAN and China seemed to have achieved a breakthrough on 20th July on the contentious SCS issue when they agreed to adopt non-binding guidelines on moving towards resolving the sovereignty conflict in the SCS, which marked the first sign of progress since ASEAN and China signed the informal commitment to resolve disputes peacefully in 2002. 51 However, as mentioned earlier, the effort to build consensus through official multilateral exchanges is similarly riddled with difficulties even with support from a powerful third party. ASEAN's attempt to agree on a blueprint for dealing with territorial disputes with China in the July 2012 summit collapsed in disarray despite US support. 52 During a news conference in Jakarta in September 2012, Hilary Clinton again waded into the dispute and said that it was essential to "get faltering diplomacy back on track" and for China and the Southeast Asian countries to draw up a "code of conduct" in the resolution of the SCS conflict. 53 Further, commander of the US Pacific Command, Samuel J. Lcklear III, stated that the US would remain impartial in the SCS disputes and hope that the disputes could be resolved amicably, through dialogues and other peaceful measures. 54 However, China's stance has always been to negotiate disputes with each claimant country individually, resisting a multilateral approach. In fact, China believes that US's intervention is stirring up further disputes within the region. This is illustrated when Beijing summoned the US Envoy to express "strong dissatisfaction" over a US statement in August 2012 stating that China's establishment of the Sansha garrison further inflated long-standing tensions over the SCS area. 55 With China and the US being the world's two leading economic powerhouses, and both countries harbouring strategic suspicion about each other, the US is unlikely to successfully play the mediator role among the claimant countries in the SCS disputes. Not surprisingly, the Chinese Foreign Ministry regarded the intervention as an attack on China 56 despite the US stating in a daily press briefing in August that it had always been encouraging ASEAN to "work with" China. In fact, an "insider" of the ASEAN region, such as Indonesia, Singapore or Thailand, who has no claim to the disputed areas has better chances in facilitating the peaceful resolution of the conflict. 57 Commendable effort has been seen by countries like Indonesia attempting to rally her Southeast Asian compatriots at the United Nations meeting in September 2012 to reignite talks with China in relation to the SCS disputes. 58 However, there is little to show for the effort thus far.
The road to an amicable resolution for the SCS conflict will not be smooth but the well recognized need to maintain a harmonious environment for regional prosperity, the geostrategic importance to each other between ASEAN and China amidst increasing trade and investment and especially within the framework of newly incepted ASEAN-China Free Trade Area and on the part of China, the long-running guiding initiatives of her "open-door policy" (since 1978), "good neighbour policy" (since 1990) and "going global strategy" (since 2002) and the continuing promotion of her "peaceful rise"/"peaceful development" image will combine to play a positive role to take the July 2011 ASEAN Summit breakthrough further on the road of rational regional reconciliation, confidence-building and conflict resolution over the SCS. Such considerations will also counteract the need to cater for riding domestic nationalism as the recent State responses to domestic nationalistic outbursts, especially in China and Vietnam, serve well to illustrate the State's awareness of the danger of runaway nationalistic-xenophobic expressions as such, as nationalist sentiments have always been known to be a double-edged sword which do not always complement the interest of the government and whose greatest impact could eventually be felt domestically rather than on the external front. 
Notes

